The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 'Maintaining Momentum in Syria's Energy Sector', 19 August 2025
Source ID
SRC-337
Citation
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 'Maintaining Momentum in Syria's Energy Sector', 19 August 2025
URL or path
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/maintaining-momentum-syrias-energy-sector; PDF at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf/view/19490/en; research/SRC-D2_WashInst_maintaining_momentum_2025-08-19.html and .pdf; text at research/SRC-D2_WashInst_maintaining_momentum_2025-08-19.txt
Type
Think-tank policy analysis
Hierarchy tier
4
Published
2025-08-19
Accessed
2026-08-22
Snapshot
HTML and PDF archived and converted to text 22 August 2026
Claims
Retrieval D2; and it resolves conflict 8.3
Status
READ
Version history
The register keeps changing after the book is fixed in print. Each entry below was added to this row in the order shown.
RETRIEVED AND READ IN FULL, 22 AUGUST 2026, retrieval D2 of the Chapter 8 gate. THE SENTENCE THE MANUSCRIPT PRIZES IS CONFIRMED VERBATIM AND IT IS LONGER THAN THE MANUSCRIPT QUOTES: 'Today, Syria produces around 90,000 bpd of oil from seventy-eight fields and an estimated (but unverified) 7.5 mcm/d of gas from twenty-eight fields (UP FROM THE LAST ESTIMATE, IN 2012, OF 5.6 MCM/D).' The parenthesis the manuscript calls the most accurate thing published about Syrian gas is there, and so is a fact the manuscript omits: THE PREVIOUS ESTIMATE DATES FROM 2012. A gas figure whose predecessor is thirteen years old is the chapter's point made twice over. Also on the face: seventy-eight oil fields; the SDF 'control forty-one of these fields in Deir al-Zour province, including al-Omar (around 20,000 bpd), Jafrah (1,000 bpd), al-Tanak, and the nonoperational Conoco gas site'; pre-war gas production 'reached 9 mcm/d'; 'an estimated total of $115.2 billion in damage' to both sectors; and imports of 'up to 100,000 barrels per day from Iran'. NOTE THE AL-OMAR CONFLICT: this gives around 20,000 bpd in August 2025 and the source manuscript gives around 5,000 bpd as of 14 July 2026. Different dates, and the register should not treat them as rival estimates of one moment. THIS DOCUMENT RESOLVES CONFLICT 8.3 OF THE GATE AND CORRECTS THE MANUSCRIPT ON BOTH LIMBS. Source Chapter 7 line 2173 says 'the Kilis to Aleppo line that carries them opened on 2 August 2025 with a capacity of up to 6 million cubic metres a day'. What this document says, VERBATIM: 'On August 2, the Azerbaijani state energy company SOCAR announced that it will export 1.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from offshore fields in the Caspian Sea through a recently repaired pipeline stretching between Kilis, Turkey, and Aleppo, Syria. The deal's initial phase would supply 3.4 million cubic meters per day (mcm/d) to Aleppo's Thermal Power Plant, generating around 900 megawatts of much-needed electricity. This supply COULD BE INCREASED to 6 mcm/d and sent further south now that a pipeline from Aleppo to Homs has reportedly been completed.' SO 2 AUGUST 2025 IS THE DATE OF AN AZERBAIJANI ANNOUNCEMENT, NOT THE DATE THE LINE OPENED, and 6 mcm/d is a POSSIBLE FUTURE INCREASE from an initial 3.4, not the line's capacity. The manuscript has converted an announcement date into an opening date and a contingent volume into a stated capacity. Both must be corrected. AND THE PIPELINE CARRIES TWO SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS THAT MUST NOT BE ADDED: Turkiye's own supply at up to 2 billion cubic metres a year, being about 5.5 mcm/d, at SRC-331; and SOCAR's Azerbaijani gas at 1.2 billion cubic metres a year, being 3.4 mcm/d initially. Same pipe, two suppliers, two volumes.