What the claim says, the source it rests on, the limits on it, and what remains to be checked.
| Identifier | Exact or summary claim |
|---|---|
| GCF-001 | A current NDC is a universal condition for climate-fund disbursement |
| GCF-002 | SAP072 proves a Syrian public institution can receive and account directly for GCF funds |
| CBAM-001 | First annual declaration for 2026 imports is due February 2027 |
| CBAM-002 | Every covered producer inherits origin-grid indirect emissions |
| CLIMATE-001 | Economic collapse created decoupling and lower carbon intensity |
| FISCAL-001 | GDP, revenue, expenditure and hydrocarbon share form one consistent fiscal picture |
| FISCAL-002 | Syria's 2025 fiscal surplus reflects improved administration and revenue recovery |
| IMF-001 | Resumption of Article IV consultations with Syria is conditioned on data availability and quality |
| CBSY-001 | Mohammad Safwat Raslan is Governor of the Central Bank of Syria |
| TARIFF-001 | Syrian electricity tariff Decision No. 687 of 30 October 2025 has a published signed text |
| WAQF-001 | More than half of the Hamidiyah souk is registered in the name of the religious endowment |
| ENFORCE-001 | No lender's remedy against Syria can be described |
| DEBT-001 | No reconciled Syrian external debt baseline exists or is being produced |
| SUKUK-001 | Sovereign sukuk are asset-backed by construction |
| FSIA-001 | Syria is denied sovereign immunity and any reachable asset is exposed |
| APP-001 | The appendix contains 199 unique failing figures |
| CARBON-001 | Syria can earn $10–25m carbon revenue annually by 2030 |
| NORWAY-001 | Norway exclusion removal indicates ESG allocation to Syrian bonds |
| INTRO-001 | The World Bank October 2025 assessment states that it does not provide detailed disaggregation by sectors or individual asset types, that the estimate will need to be supplemented |
| INTRO-002 | No whole-of-Syria, sector-disaggregated damage and reconstruction costing covering the conflict period had been published after the October 2025 assessment, as at 9 August 2026 |
| INTRO-003 | The author's financing register holds 28 records touching Syria, of which 12 have had their stage verified against the document itself |
| INTRO-004 | Across all twenty-eight, as at 10 August 2026, no record carries a published figure for money disbursed to Syria |
| INTRO-004a | Of the twenty-eight records in the register, one carries a published figure for money disbursed and twenty-seven do not |
| INTRO-005 | Reconstruction is costed at US$216 billion in December 2024 US dollars, a conservative best estimate within a published range, and physical damage at US$108 billion. The two measur |
| INTRO-006 | Morten Jerven's Poor Numbers established direct contact with statisticians or stakeholders in 23 of the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa, by unstructured interview in seven of th |
| INTRO-007 | "[quotation withheld, 67 words; follow the citation]""At Least""[quotation withheld, 56 words; follow the citation]" |
| CH1-001 | Correcting scope makes the Development Programme and the World Bank converge, so that on the quantity they both measure the United Nations and the Bank agree |
| CH1-002 | The Development Programme's US$799.4 billion is foregone output, being a modelled counterfactual at constant 2010 prices against an assumed 5 per cent annual growth path to end 202 |
| CH1-003 | The Development Programme's US$123.3 billion of destroyed physical capital aggregates three components on three different price bases, three different periods and three different m |
| CH1-004 | WITHDRAWN AND REVERSED. I claimed that correcting for price basis moves the United Nations and World Bank capital figures further apart. It moves them closer, and the World Bank ha |
| CH1-005 | Whether the World Bank's 2011 to 2024 conflict damage assessment includes or excludes the February 2023 earthquake damage is not established by this project |
| CH1-006 | The World Bank's own annex compares its estimate against ten previous studies restated to a common price basis, and reports that its US$108 billion aligns well with them |
| CH1-007 | The US$250 billion figure has two candidate origins and the manuscript asserts only one of them |
| CH1-008 | The US$216 billion is net of reconstruction already completed, because the model credits an estimated already-rebuilt share of damage in each governorate |
| CH1-009 | SUPERSEDED 12 August 2026. This row stated that the March 2025 European Parliamentary Research Service briefing cites no source for either end of its range. The briefing prints no |
| CH1-010 | The apparent fall in reported sustainable investment assets from about US$30 trillion to US$16.7 trillion is a change of measurement scope, not a contraction; on the consistent bas |
| CH1-011 | UNHCR's May 2026 operational update gives 5,542,227 internally displaced, 1,917,862 IDP returnees and 1,667,078 returnees from countries of asylum, and footnotes the first to OCHA |
| CH1-012 | No published Green Climate Fund document states a sum of readiness support disbursed to Syria, as at 10 August 2026 |
| INTRO-008 | The first edition claimed that forty per cent of Syria's national budget disappeared through corruption each year, and no audit, assessment or study behind it could be found |
| CH2-001 | Rami Makhlouf controlled 60 per cent of the Syrian economy on the eve of the uprising. The chapter prints NO share and traces the claim to an article that does not contain one. |
| CH2-002 | Global Financial Integrity estimated illicit outflows from Syria over 2000 to 2009 at US$23.6 billion. Table 9 gives TWO figures: normalised conservative US$15,288 million and non- |
| CH2-003 | Syrian gross domestic product per capita in 2010, circulating as about US$2,800 to US$2,890 and attributed to the International Monetary Fund. No Fund publication carrying it has b |
| CH2-004 | In August 2010 the Syrian government announced that official corruption over the preceding nineteen months amounted to five billion old Syrian pounds, about US$104 million. |
| CH2-005 | Over 104 billion old Syrian pounds, equivalent to US$13.7 million, were discovered in corruption cases in the Syrian financial year 2022, of which seven billion were recovered. |
| CH2-006 | The Syrian pound of 2010 and the Syrian pound of 2022 are old Syrian pounds, the unit in use at both dates, which the Central Bank of Syria announced on 28 December 2025 it would r |
| CH1-013 | Syria has not conducted a census of population and housing since 2004 |
| CH1-014 | The World Bank assessment publishes no split of value by ownership, and carries no ownership or tenure data at all |
| CH1-015 | On 14 January 2020 the World Bank APPROVED an additional credit of US$200 million to the Government of Nepal for its Earthquake Housing Reconstruction Project, and the AGREEMENT WA |
| CH2-007 | Al Jazeera of 24 December 2019 describes Rami Makhlouf as a man 'who reportedly controls up to 60 percent of Syria's economy', and Middle East Eye of 19 May 2020 prints 'He is ofte |
| CH2-008 | Syria carries an X in both the CED and the GER columns of Table 14 of the Global Financial Integrity study, headed 'Countries Dropped to Zero Due to Normalization', whose caption s |
| CH2-009 | The Global Financial Integrity study's first normalisation filter excludes countries showing the wrong signs 'in a majority of the nine-year period', its own worked example running |
| CH2-010 | The World Bank assessment restates the Development Programme's US$123.3 billion of destroyed physical capital to December 2024 values as US$117 billion, against the Bank's own US$1 |
| CH2-011 | The Toll of War prints Syria's pre-conflict population as 20.7 million in 2010 sourced to World Development Indicators, and 20,720,602 in Table 2.5, and prints 2010 total output 'i |
| CH2-012 | The press release of 1 December 2011 reproduces, inside a block quotation of the blog post, a passage asking that countries make it harder 'for corrupt public officials like al-Asa |
| CH3-001 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-002 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-003 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-004 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-005 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-006 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-007 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-001 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-002 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-003 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-004 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-005 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-006 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-007 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-008 | USD 7.6 billion is the higher of two competing estimates of the LIMIT of Iran's credit line to Syria, not a verifiable civilian component of any claim |
| CH3-009 | Documents reported leaked from Iran's foreign ministry put Syria's debt to Iran at USD 50 billion over ten years, military and civilian, with agreements covering USD 18 billion of |
| CH4-008 | Pinheiro Principle 21.1 provides three alternative gateways to compensation in lieu of restitution, and knowing consent is one of them rather than a requirement |
| CH5-001 | Decrees 112 and 113 of 2025 specify different transparency machinery on the same day, on the same authority: 112 requires audit by neutral accounting firms and publication in the O |
| CH5-002 | A state assessment of why buildings collapsed in the 6 February 2023 earthquake was carried out by five-member committees in four governorates, and their reports are known only thr |
| OWNERSHIP-001 | Non-Syrian ownership of a Syrian private bank is capped at 49 per cent, raisable to 60 per cent by a Council of Ministers decision on the Credit and Monetary Council's proposal whe |
| DEPOSIT-001 | The Central Bank of Syria has decided to establish a deposit guarantee institution; no scheme is in operation and the establishment procedures are not complete |
| POP-001 | World Population Prospects 2024, medium variant, puts the Syrian Arab Republic at 25,620,427 on 1 July 2025 and 26,472,497 on 1 July 2026, and at 25,170,891 and 26,069,962 on 1 Jan |
| GAZ-001 | An online archive of the Syrian Official Gazette, run by The Syria Report, is browsable free and without a login by issue number, part and date; for the years whose contents it has |
| BUDGET-001 | Article 1 of Law No. 37 of 2009 sets the appropriations of the Syrian general budget for the financial year 2010 at 754 billion Syrian pounds, and Article 2 estimates the revenues |
| AN-001 | The first edition of Rewriting the Rules stated, at its line 1011, that 'it is estimated that for every ten doctors trained in Syria, fewer than two remain'. It named no source at |
| SEIS-001 | Chapter 5's reading of the 2013 earthquake appendix: that section 3-4-1 requires every site to be classified into a soil profile model on documented geological data, that section 3 |
| SOLAR-001 | Off-grid solar capacity in Syria reached 2,060 MW in 2025, against 189 MW grid-connected |
| SUPPLY-001 | Syria's national grid supplies about two to four hours of electricity a day |
| LOSS-001 | Syria's electricity system loses about a third of what it generates |
| GAS-001 | Syrian natural gas production is about 7 to 8 million cubic metres a day |
| PROJ-001 | Announced Syrian renewable and power projects have produced signed instruments but no financial close |
| FINANCE-001 | Syria operated a state-backed interest-free household solar loan scheme from 2023, and it was suspended on 19 December 2024 |
| SST-001 | SUPERSEDED 24 AUGUST 2026 AND THE DESIGNATION WAS RESCINDED. What this row recorded, as at 23 August 2026, was that syria remains designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism by the Uni |
| OILRES-001 | Syria's proved oil reserves, on a liquids-aggregate definition that includes crude oil, lease condensate, natural gas liquids and oil sands, are published as 2,500,000 thousand bar |
| OILPROD-001 | Syrian crude oil production in 2024 is put at about 63,000 barrels a day by two independent publications, and forecast at 73,000 for 2025 |
| GASRES-001 | Syria's proved natural gas reserves are published as 8,500 billion cubic feet, and the figure has been reprinted unchanged for at least five years |
| PHOSRES-001 | Syria holds 250,000 thousand metric tons of phosphate rock reserves, about 0.34 per cent of the world total, ranking fifteenth of the twenty-four countries the survey names |
| PHOSPROD-001 | The United States Geological Survey revised its estimate of Syrian phosphate rock production for 2024 from 2,000 to 800 thousand metric tons, a reduction of 60 per cent, a year aft |
| FLARE-001 | Syrian gas flaring fell from 0.74 to 0.63 billion cubic metres between 2024 and 2025, and flaring intensity from 37.32 to 22.87 cubic metres per barrel, the largest decline of any |
| OLIVE-001 | European Union imports of Syrian olive oil fell from EUR 56.4 million in 2023 to EUR 36.3 million in 2024 and EUR 4.8 million in 2025, and the grade composition inverted as they fe |
| HTS-001 | Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusrah Front, carries no organisation-level terrorism designation in the United States, the United Nations or the United Kingdom as at 25 August |
| CODE-001 | Syria's transmission and distribution network codes are defined by regulation, approved by the Ministry of Electricity, and binding on the subscribers who connect to each network, |
| SST-002 | The United States rescinded Syria's State Sponsor of Terrorism designation on 24 August 2026 and Syria was gone from the department's published list by 25 August 2026. The export-c |
| REMIT-001 | "[quotation withheld, 6 words; follow the citation]""[quotation withheld, 31 words; follow the citation]""" |
| REMIT-002 | The World Bank and KNOMAD exclude Syria from their own 2023 remittance figures for the Middle East and North Africa, and give want of data as the reason |
| ECA-001 | Two export credit agencies publish an explicit Syria position and both are no cover, while the OECD classifies Syria at category 7 and records it as tied-aid eligible at 35 per cen |
| CH5-003 | On 22 August 2026 the Syrian Sovereign Fund's deputy director general published a signed public statement answering the transparency question by quoting Decree 113's governance cla |
| SHAM-001 | An application called Sham Cash is the vehicle for all Syrian state salaries, is not recognised as a bank, and the funds do not pass through the Central Bank of Syria or the global |
| HLPSAVINGS-001 | "[quotation withheld, 56 words; follow the citation]""[quotation withheld, 12 words; follow the citation]""" |
| CORR-001 | This book has not found a live commercial correspondent relationship between a Syrian bank and a foreign bank, named, with a counterparty and a date. THE CLAIM IS ABOUT WHAT THIS B |
| CH4-AOI-001 | The Arab Opinion Index 2025 Syrian sample is 3,691 respondents in the published microdata and 3,690 in the fielding institution’s results announcement, and the survey is a split ba |
| CH4-AOI-002 | Weighting the Arab Opinion Index Syrian data moves the share saying it makes no difference to them from 65.4 to 66.5 per cent, and the weight variation implies a design effect of a |
| CH4-AOI-003 | The Arab Opinion Index published 84 per cent for Syrians believing people classify themselves and others by sect or religion, being the first three of four scale points, and 70 per |