What the claim says, the source it rests on, the limits on it, and what remains to be checked.
| Identifier | Exact or summary claim |
|---|---|
| GCF-001 | A current NDC is a universal condition for climate-fund disbursement |
| GCF-002 | SAP072 proves a Syrian public institution can receive and account directly for GCF funds |
| CBAM-001 | First annual declaration for 2026 imports is due February 2027 |
| CBAM-002 | Every covered producer inherits origin-grid indirect emissions |
| CLIMATE-001 | Economic collapse created decoupling and lower carbon intensity |
| FISCAL-001 | GDP, revenue, expenditure and hydrocarbon share form one consistent fiscal picture |
| FISCAL-002 | Syria's 2025 fiscal surplus reflects improved administration and revenue recovery |
| IMF-001 | Resumption of Article IV consultations with Syria is conditioned on data availability and quality |
| CBSY-001 | Mohammad Safwat Raslan is Governor of the Central Bank of Syria |
| TARIFF-001 | Syrian electricity tariff Decision No. 687 of 30 October 2025 has a published signed text |
| WAQF-001 | More than half of the Hamidiyah souk is registered in the name of the religious endowment |
| ENFORCE-001 | No lender's remedy against Syria can be described |
| DEBT-001 | No reconciled Syrian external debt baseline exists or is being produced |
| SUKUK-001 | Sovereign sukuk are asset-backed by construction |
| FSIA-001 | Syria is denied sovereign immunity and any reachable asset is exposed |
| APP-001 | The appendix contains 199 unique failing figures |
| CARBON-001 | Syria can earn $10–25m carbon revenue annually by 2030 |
| NORWAY-001 | Norway exclusion removal indicates ESG allocation to Syrian bonds |
| INTRO-001 | The World Bank October 2025 assessment states that it does not provide detailed disaggregation by sectors or individual asset types, that the estimate will need to be supplemented |
| INTRO-002 | No whole-of-Syria, sector-disaggregated damage and reconstruction costing covering the conflict period had been published after the October 2025 assessment, as at 9 August 2026 |
| INTRO-003 | The author's financing register holds 28 records touching Syria, of which 12 have had their stage verified against the document itself |
| INTRO-004 | Across all twenty-eight, as at 10 August 2026, no record carries a published figure for money disbursed to Syria |
| INTRO-004a | Of the twenty-eight records in the register, one carries a published figure for money disbursed and twenty-seven do not |
| INTRO-005 | Reconstruction is costed at US$216 billion in December 2024 US dollars, a conservative best estimate within a published range, and physical damage at US$108 billion. The two measur |
| INTRO-006 | Morten Jerven's Poor Numbers established direct contact with statisticians or stakeholders in 23 of the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa, by unstructured interview in seven of th |
| INTRO-007 | "[quotation withheld, 67 words; follow the citation]""At Least""[quotation withheld, 56 words; follow the citation]" |
| CH1-001 | Correcting scope makes the Development Programme and the World Bank converge, so that on the quantity they both measure the United Nations and the Bank agree |
| CH1-002 | The Development Programme's US$799.4 billion is foregone output, being a modelled counterfactual at constant 2010 prices against an assumed 5 per cent annual growth path to end 202 |
| CH1-003 | The Development Programme's US$123.3 billion of destroyed physical capital aggregates three components on three different price bases, three different periods and three different m |
| CH1-004 | WITHDRAWN AND REVERSED. I claimed that correcting for price basis moves the United Nations and World Bank capital figures further apart. It moves them closer, and the World Bank ha |
| CH1-005 | Whether the World Bank's 2011 to 2024 conflict damage assessment includes or excludes the February 2023 earthquake damage is not established by this project |
| CH1-006 | The World Bank's own annex compares its estimate against ten previous studies restated to a common price basis, and reports that its US$108 billion aligns well with them |
| CH1-007 | The US$250 billion figure has two candidate origins and the manuscript asserts only one of them |
| CH1-008 | The US$216 billion is net of reconstruction already completed, because the model credits an estimated already-rebuilt share of damage in each governorate |
| CH1-009 | SUPERSEDED 12 August 2026. This row stated that the March 2025 European Parliamentary Research Service briefing cites no source for either end of its range. The briefing prints no |
| CH1-010 | The apparent fall in reported sustainable investment assets from about US$30 trillion to US$16.7 trillion is a change of measurement scope, not a contraction; on the consistent bas |
| CH1-011 | UNHCR's May 2026 operational update gives 5,542,227 internally displaced, 1,917,862 IDP returnees and 1,667,078 returnees from countries of asylum, and footnotes the first to OCHA |
| CH1-012 | No published Green Climate Fund document states a sum of readiness support disbursed to Syria, as at 10 August 2026 |
| INTRO-008 | The first edition claimed that forty per cent of Syria's national budget disappeared through corruption each year, and no audit, assessment or study behind it could be found |
| CH2-001 | Rami Makhlouf controlled 60 per cent of the Syrian economy on the eve of the uprising. The chapter prints NO share and traces the claim to an article that does not contain one. |
| CH2-002 | Global Financial Integrity estimated illicit outflows from Syria over 2000 to 2009 at US$23.6 billion. Table 9 gives TWO figures: normalised conservative US$15,288 million and non- |
| CH2-003 | Syrian gross domestic product per capita in 2010, circulating as about US$2,800 to US$2,890 and attributed to the International Monetary Fund. No Fund publication carrying it has b |
| CH2-004 | In August 2010 the Syrian government announced that official corruption over the preceding nineteen months amounted to five billion old Syrian pounds, about US$104 million. |
| CH2-005 | Over 104 billion old Syrian pounds, equivalent to US$13.7 million, were discovered in corruption cases in the Syrian financial year 2022, of which seven billion were recovered. |
| CH2-006 | The Syrian pound of 2010 and the Syrian pound of 2022 are old Syrian pounds, the unit in use at both dates, which the Central Bank of Syria announced on 28 December 2025 it would r |
| CH1-013 | Syria has not conducted a census of population and housing since 2004 |
| CH1-014 | The World Bank assessment publishes no split of value by ownership, and carries no ownership or tenure data at all |
| CH1-015 | On 14 January 2020 the World Bank APPROVED an additional credit of US$200 million to the Government of Nepal for its Earthquake Housing Reconstruction Project, and the AGREEMENT WA |
| CH2-007 | Al Jazeera of 24 December 2019 describes Rami Makhlouf as a man 'who reportedly controls up to 60 percent of Syria's economy', and Middle East Eye of 19 May 2020 prints 'He is ofte |
| CH2-008 | Syria carries an X in both the CED and the GER columns of Table 14 of the Global Financial Integrity study, headed 'Countries Dropped to Zero Due to Normalization', whose caption s |
| CH2-009 | The Global Financial Integrity study's first normalisation filter excludes countries showing the wrong signs 'in a majority of the nine-year period', its own worked example running |
| CH2-010 | The World Bank assessment restates the Development Programme's US$123.3 billion of destroyed physical capital to December 2024 values as US$117 billion, against the Bank's own US$1 |
| CH2-011 | The Toll of War prints Syria's pre-conflict population as 20.7 million in 2010 sourced to World Development Indicators, and 20,720,602 in Table 2.5, and prints 2010 total output 'i |
| CH2-012 | The press release of 1 December 2011 reproduces, inside a block quotation of the blog post, a passage asking that countries make it harder 'for corrupt public officials like al-Asa |
| CH3-001 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-002 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-003 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-004 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-005 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-006 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-007 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-001 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-002 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-003 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-004 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-005 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-006 | VOID ROW |
| CH4-007 | VOID ROW |
| CH3-008 | USD 7.6 billion is the higher of two competing estimates of the LIMIT of Iran's credit line to Syria, not a verifiable civilian component of any claim |
| CH3-009 | Documents reported leaked from Iran's foreign ministry put Syria's debt to Iran at USD 50 billion over ten years, military and civilian, with agreements covering USD 18 billion of |
| CH4-008 | Pinheiro Principle 21.1 provides three alternative gateways to compensation in lieu of restitution, and knowing consent is one of them rather than a requirement |
| CH5-001 | Decrees 112 and 113 of 2025 specify different transparency machinery on the same day, on the same authority: 112 requires audit by neutral accounting firms and publication in the O |
| CH5-002 | A state assessment of why buildings collapsed in the 6 February 2023 earthquake was carried out by five-member committees in four governorates. What this book holds is a specialist |
| OWNERSHIP-001 | Non-Syrian ownership of a Syrian private bank is capped at 49 per cent, raisable to 60 per cent by a Council of Ministers decision on the Credit and Monetary Council's proposal whe |
| DEPOSIT-001 | The Central Bank of Syria has decided to establish a deposit guarantee institution; no scheme is in operation and the establishment procedures are not complete |
| POP-001 | World Population Prospects 2024, medium variant, puts the Syrian Arab Republic at 25,620,427 on 1 July 2025 and 26,472,497 on 1 July 2026, and at 25,170,891 and 26,069,962 on 1 Jan |
| GAZ-001 | An online archive of the Syrian Official Gazette, run by The Syria Report, is browsable free and without a login by issue number, part and date; for the years whose contents it has |
| BUDGET-001 | Article 1 of Law No. 37 of 2009 sets the appropriations of the Syrian general budget for the financial year 2010 at 754 billion Syrian pounds, and Article 2 estimates the revenues |
| AN-001 | The first edition of Rewriting the Rules stated, at its line 1011, that 'it is estimated that for every ten doctors trained in Syria, fewer than two remain'. It named no source at |
| SEIS-001 | Chapter 5's reading of the 2013 earthquake appendix: that section 3-4-1 requires every site to be classified into a soil profile model on documented geological data, that section 3 |
| SOLAR-001 | Off-grid solar capacity in Syria reached 2,060 MW in 2025, against 189 MW grid-connected |
| SUPPLY-001 | Syria's national grid supplies about two to four hours of electricity a day |
| LOSS-001 | Syria's electricity system loses about a third of what it generates |
| GAS-001 | Syrian natural gas production is about 7 to 8 million cubic metres a day |
| PROJ-001 | Announced Syrian renewable and power projects have produced signed instruments but no financial close |
| FINANCE-001 | Syria operated a state-backed interest-free household solar loan scheme from 2023, and it was suspended on 19 December 2024 |
| SST-001 | SUPERSEDED 24 AUGUST 2026 AND THE DESIGNATION WAS RESCINDED. What this row recorded, as at 23 August 2026, was that syria remains designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism by the Uni |
| OILRES-001 | Syria's proved oil reserves, on a liquids-aggregate definition that includes crude oil, lease condensate, natural gas liquids and oil sands, are published as 2,500,000 thousand bar |
| OILPROD-001 | Syrian crude oil production in 2024 is put at about 63,000 barrels a day by two independent publications, and forecast at 73,000 for 2025 |
| GASRES-001 | Syria's proved natural gas reserves are published as 8,500 billion cubic feet, and the figure has been reprinted unchanged for at least five years |
| PHOSRES-001 | Syria holds 250,000 thousand metric tons of phosphate rock reserves, about 0.34 per cent of the world total, ranking fifteenth of the twenty-four countries the survey names |
| PHOSPROD-001 | The United States Geological Survey revised its estimate of Syrian phosphate rock production for 2024 from 2,000 to 800 thousand metric tons, a reduction of 60 per cent, a year aft |
| FLARE-001 | Syrian gas flaring fell from 0.74 to 0.63 billion cubic metres between 2024 and 2025, and flaring intensity from 37.32 to 22.87 cubic metres per barrel, the largest decline of any |
| OLIVE-001 | European Union imports of Syrian olive oil fell from EUR 56.4 million in 2023 to EUR 36.3 million in 2024 and EUR 4.8 million in 2025, and the grade composition inverted as they fe |
| HTS-001 | Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusrah Front, carries no organisation-level terrorism designation in the United States, the United Nations or the United Kingdom as at 25 August |
| CODE-001 | Syria's transmission and distribution network codes are defined by regulation, approved by the Ministry of Electricity, and binding on the subscribers who connect to each network, |
| SST-002 | The United States rescinded Syria's State Sponsor of Terrorism designation on 24 August 2026 and Syria was gone from the department's published list by 25 August 2026. The export-c |
| REMIT-001 | "[quotation withheld, 6 words; follow the citation]""[quotation withheld, 31 words; follow the citation]""" |
| REMIT-002 | The World Bank and KNOMAD exclude Syria from their own 2023 remittance figures for the Middle East and North Africa, and give want of data as the reason |
| ECA-001 | Two export credit agencies publish an explicit Syria position and both are no cover, while the OECD classifies Syria at category 7 and records it as tied-aid eligible at 35 per cen |
| CH5-003 | On 22 August 2026 the Syrian Sovereign Fund's deputy director general published a signed public statement answering the transparency question by giving Decree 113's governance clau |
| SHAM-001 | An application called Sham Cash is the vehicle for all Syrian state salaries, is not recognised as a bank, and the funds do not pass through the Central Bank of Syria or the global |
| HLPSAVINGS-001 | "[quotation withheld, 56 words; follow the citation]""[quotation withheld, 12 words; follow the citation]""" |
| CORR-001 | By its closing date of 17 September 2026 this book had not found a live commercial correspondent relationship between a Syrian bank and a foreign bank, named, with a counterparty a |
| CH4-AOI-001 | The Arab Opinion Index 2025 Syrian sample is 3,691 respondents in the published microdata and 3,690 in the fielding institution’s results announcement, and the survey is a split ba |
| CH4-AOI-002 | Weighting the Arab Opinion Index Syrian data moves the share saying it makes no difference to them from 65.4 to 66.5 per cent, and the weight variation implies a design effect of a |
| CH4-AOI-003 | The Arab Opinion Index published 84 per cent for Syrians believing people classify themselves and others by sect or religion (the first three of four scale points, in both the Syri |
| SDF-001 | On 25 August 2026 the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces announced its dissolution as an independent military force, stating that its integration into the Syrian army was co |
| TJ-001 | As at 12 September 2026 the transitional justice law is a draft, discussed by the National Commission for Transitional Justice with members of the People's Assembly on 28 June 2026 |
| DISB-001 | At the financiers' own records, one route each, read on 11 September 2026: the World Bank's IDA Statement of Credits, Grants and Guarantees as at 31 August 2026 records disbursed a |
| FUEL-001 | From 13 September 2026 the permanent pricing committee's temporary bulletin set diesel at 175 Syrian pounds a litre, benzine 95 at 195 and benzine 90 at 185, against 125, 152 and 1 |
| BUDGET-002 | The Ministry of Finance's citizen budget for 2026 expects revenue from oil and gas of 2.434 billion US dollars, 27.9 per cent of expected revenue of 8.716 billion dollars (958.8 bi |
| CH4-L33-001 | "[quotation withheld, 119 words; follow the citation]""[quotation withheld, 14 words; follow the citation]""." |
| CH4-L33-002 | The Director-General of Real Estate Affairs, Abdul Karim Idris, stated on 15 February 2026 that about 95 per cent of the land eligible for ownership in Syria is registered in the l |
| CH4-L33-003 | "[quotation withheld, 98 words; follow the citation]""[quotation withheld, 21 words; follow the citation]""." |
| CH4-PIN-157 | Pinheiro Principle 15.7: states may, in situations of mass displacement where little documentary evidence exists as to ownership or rights of possession, adopt the conclusive presu |
| CH4-PIN-171 | Pinheiro Principle 17.1: states should ensure secondary occupants are protected against arbitrary or unlawful forced eviction, and shall ensure that evictions deemed justifiable an |
| CH4-PIN-212 | Pinheiro Principle 21.2: restitution should be deemed factually impossible only in exceptional circumstances, namely when the housing, land or property is destroyed or no longer ex |
| SHAHBA-001 | On 17 September 2026 Estithmar Holding disclosed to the Qatar Stock Exchange the completion of the transfer of a 48.68 per cent stake in Shahba Bank to Masaref Holding from Bemo Sa |
| INTRO-009 | Rewriting the Rules took its US$250 to 400 billion reconstruction range from Diana Rayes, 'Dispatch from Damascus', Atlantic Council MENASource, 3 January 2025, which gives no sour |
| CARBON-002 | Rewriting the Rules (21 October 2025, its line 1283) printed potential Syrian carbon revenues of $40-$97 million annually by 2030; the figure was the author's own estimate, printed |
| CARBON-003 | Rewriting the Rules (its line 1263) gave the voluntary carbon market's value as $1.9 billion in 2022 and $1.75 billion in 2024, citing nothing at the line; the one Ecosystem Market |
| ECA-002 | Rewriting the Rules (its line 1497) said UK Export Finance and Germany's Euler Hermes "can provide political risk insurance" against the risks of investing in Syria; both agencies' |
| OILRES-002 | The Ministry of Energy's home page states Syria's crude oil reserves as 2.4 billion barrels, with no date, source or method |
| GASRES-002 | The Ministry of Energy's home page states Syria's natural gas reserves as 211 million cubic metres, as printed, with no date, source or method |
| PHOSRES-002 | The Ministry of Energy's home page states Syria's phosphate reserves as 1.7 to 1.8 billion tonnes, with no date, source or method |
| OILPROD-002 | The Syrian Petroleum Company's website put the company's own output in 2009 at 68 million barrels of oil and 5.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas |
| GASPROD-001 | The Syrian Petroleum Company's account of its work from 2016 to 2018 says gas production rose from 6.5 million cubic metres a day in 2016 to 10 million in 2018 |
| FISCAL-003 | The Ministry of Finance's report on the first half of 2026, released 31 August 2026, gives actual revenue of US$2,695 million against spending of US$3,700 million, a deficit of US$ |
| BUDGET-003 | None of the Ministry of Finance's three documents held separates social protection: the citizen budget 2026 places it inside 41 per cent with health and education (page 27) and ins |
| GENMIX-001 | The Ministry of Energy's summary of the first half of 2026 attributes 60 per cent of production to natural gas, 30 per cent to fuel oil and 10 per cent to what it calls alternative |
| FISCAL-004 | The Ministry of Finance's summary of 2025 (dated March 2026, released 7 April 2026) gives preliminary actual revenue of US$3,493 million against spending of US$3,447 million, a sur |
| OILPROD-003 | The Statistical Abstract's table 5/5 prints Syrian crude oil production in thousand cubic metres for 2000 and each year from 2005 to 2023: 21,739 in 2010 and 3,579 in 2023, the las |
| PHOSPROD-002 | The Statistical Abstract's table 5/5 prints Syrian phosphate production in thousand tonnes for 2000 and each year from 2005 to 2023: 3,167 for 2010 (on the basis used before the 20 |
| OILPROD-004 | The former Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources' archived news items on its plan follow-up meetings state the country's oil production for dated periods from 2011 to 2021, o |
| GASPROD-002 | The former Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources' archived plan follow-up items state raw gas produced in the country for every period from 2013 to the first quarter of 2017, |
| CAESAR-001 | A report to Congress under section 8369(b) of Public Law 119-60, dated 26 June 2026, is cited by the ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Banking committees and Repr |
| CBAM-003 | Under Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956, as replaced by Regulation (EU) 2025/2083 and applying from 1 January 2026, a declarant whose embedded emissions are determined on the b |
| TEACH-001 | On the UNESCO Institute for Statistics' figures, Syria had 114,676 primary and 65,218 secondary teachers in 2002 and 144,621 and 54,596 in 2024 (primary about a quarter more, secon |
| TEACH-002 | Whether the Institute's 2002 and 2024 primary-teacher counts (and the trained share of them) measure the same population, given that Syria's basic-education cycles were reorganised |
| PAY-001 | Ministry of Finance Decision No. 1654/و of 24 May 2026 (Official Gazette 2026, issue 22 part one, gazette page 256) amends the wage tables annexed to Decision No. 2700 of 2006 for |
| OLIVE-002 | In EU27 imports of Syrian olive oil under HS 1509, 2023 is the highest year by customs value from 2010 to 2025, and in 2021 the grade composition had already turned over once: extr |
| CH5-004 | Under Legislative Decree No. 80 of 2010, striking off from the Syndicate register is a severe disciplinary penalty for an engineer (Art. 67(b)(3)); disciplinary offences lapse thre |
| FISCAL-005 | The World Bank's Macro Poverty Outlook puts Syria's overall fiscal balance at minus 7.7, minus 5.1 and plus 1.4 per cent of GDP for 2023, 2024 and 2025 in its April 2026 edition, e |
| CH4-MAROTA-001 | On Damascus Governorate's own account (statement of 5 May 2026 on its official channel), original owners' floor area in Marota City was to rise by 13.9 per cent and the rent allowa |
| CH4-LATEST-001 | [AMENDED 19 OCTOBER 2026 (CONSOLIDATED B-5, R-X-2), THE STRUCK WORDING QUOTED: 'The most recent evidence the chapter holds for the Homs Dream is December 2019 (the governor's state |
| DISB-002 | On the financiers' own records read on 18 October 2026: the Green Climate Fund records US$6,003,501 disbursed on SAP072 to ACTED, its accredited entity, effective 14 October 2026 ( |
| HUM-001 | Contributions reported to the OCHA Financial Tracking Service against the 2026 Syria humanitarian plan (plan 1518) were US$942,198,905 against requirements of US$2,922,184,830, 32. |
| CARD-001 | International card acceptance in Syria is dated three ways: a Central Bank decision of 4 May 2026 (the permission), trade reports of a connection, a trial and one bank (Qatar Natio |
| NDC-001 | As at 18 October 2026 the UNFCCC NDC Registry's default view (active entries) shows 352 entries, the newest submitted on 15 October 2026, and one for Syria, the First NDC, submitte |
| CBAM-VER-001 | As at 18 October 2026, verifiers accredited for CBAM activity group I (cement clinker, cement) exist in Italy (three, by Accredia's decision of 28 September 2026), Greece (Emicert, |
| CH5-005 | The Central Organization for Financial Control's own work report for 2025 (cover dated 31 March 2026, posted 17 September 2026) gives about 680 billion pounds and more than US$3.4 |
| CH5-006 | On 18 October 2026, as SANA printed it that day, Decree No. 191 of 2026 named Omar Samer al-Halabi chairman of the board of the Sovereign Fund, which it says was formed by Decree N |
| RETURNS-001 | UNHCR's August 2026 operational update gives 1,795,641 returnees from countries of asylum and 2,009,506 IDP returnees, both counted from December 2024 |